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COPYFIGHTS TO COME: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT




Since the late 1990s, developers of peer-to-peer file-
sharing software have been the focus of a series of important
cases testing the bounds of third-party liability in the digital
age.1 Companies with questionable motives and suspect
business models frequently asserted that their products-
used almost exclusively to infringe copyrighted works-were
nonetheless subject to a key limitation on liability established
nearly twenty years prior in the United States Supreme
Court's famous decision, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.2 Sony's rule, crafted to address copyright
infringement in a world of analog technology, struck a
balance between the interests of technologists and copyright
owners.' As analog copying was displaced by an increase in
digital copying, however, appellate courts struggled to apply
Sony's rule to copyright infringement claims related to digital
technologies, particularly peer-to-peer file sharing.
The Court's subsequent decision in Metro-Goldwyn-
Editor-in-Chief, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 46; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., Political Science, University of California,
San Diego. The author would like to thank his wife Christina for her
encouragement and support throughout the writing of this comment.
1. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162-63 (9th Cir.
2004), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
2. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
3. See id. at 442; see also infra text accompanying notes 40-44.
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Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.4 seemingly resolved the
question of whether the Sony doctrine applied to illicit file-
sharing networks. Under the Court's ruling, companies
acting with the intent to cause infringement could not benefit
from Sony's protection.5 While Grokster resolved the issue of
liability for digital products made and distributed in
furtherance of an unlawful objective,6 it raised an important
question about the extent of Sony's protection of good-faith
innovators whose digital products push the bounds of
traditional media distribution in what has been called "the
participation age."'
The unresolved question in Grokster will likely be the
next front in the "copyfight"8 between old and new media, this
time pitting mainstream, consumer-participation-oriented
companies against copyright owners.9 These disputes will
further challenge the bounds of Sony and continue to raise
difficult questions about how the traditional common-law
doctrines of third-party liability for copyright infringement
will be applied in the digital context.
This comment discusses the background principles and
case law that have developed the contributory copyright
infringement doctrine, particularly in the area of peer-to-peer
file sharing.1 ° Part III then explains the problem created by a
lack of guidance in the U.S. Supreme Court's Grokster
4. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764
(2005).
5. See id. at 2779.
6. See id.
7. Andreas Kuth, Among the Audience: A Survey of New Media, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 22, 2006, at 3-4 (noting the "profound implications [of the age
of participation] for traditional business models in the media industry, which
are based on aggregating large passive audiences and holding them
captive . . ").
8. A "copyfight" is a term that has been coined to refer to "the struggle over
the future of the rights to duplicate and transform information ... [that] takes
place in the realm of ideas-between the covers of law reviews, in position
papers, on editorial pages, and online in the blogosphere." Lawrence B. Solum,
The Future of Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2005) (reviewing
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004)); see also
What Does "Copyfight" Mean?, Copyfight,
http://copyfight.corante.com/archives/2005/07/30/what-does-copyfight-mean.php
(last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
9. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Studios Not Sure Whether Web Video Innovator
Is Friend or Foe, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at C1.
10. See discussion infra Part II.
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decision.1 Part IV examines the Ninth Circuit's treatment of
Sony, 1 2 how the Grokster decision left a gap in what was a
significant part of the Ninth Circuit's contributory liability
analysis, 3 and why the Ninth Circuit must resolve this
ambiguity by crafting a test to assess the scope of Sony's
protection in what this comment refers to as the "inverse
Grokster" scenario.14 Finally, Part V proposes a balancing
test that provides consistency with Ninth Circuit precedent
while complying with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Grokster.1"
II. BACKGROUND
The Sony and Grokster decisions were both based on
doctrines of third-party liability for copyright infringement
with origins in the common law. This part begins with a
discussion of the constitutional, statutory, and case-law
justifications for the doctrine of contributory liability and
emphasizes the policy interests behind the doctrine.16 Next,
this part summarizes the Court's seminal decision in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,17 and the
case law that gave rise to differing interpretations of Sony in
the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals." Finally,
this part discusses both the Ninth Circuit and U.S. Supreme
Court rulings in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.'9
A. Contributory Liability for Copyright Infringement
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to
grant authors of creative works the exclusive right to their
creations for a limited period of time.20 The Copyright Act of
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
14. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
15. See discussion infra Part V.
16. See discussion infra Part II.A.
17. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984);
see discussion infra Part II.B.
18. See discussion infra Part II.C.1-2.
19. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764
(2005); see discussion infra Part II.D. 1-2.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-200
(2003).
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1976 grants the author of a copyrighted work a divisible
"bundle" of exclusive rights.2 1 The unauthorized exercise of
any one of these rights constitutes a direct infringement of
the author's copyright.22
Although the Copyright Act addresses and provides
remedies for direct infringement, liability for copyright
infringement is not limited to direct infringers. Courts also
impose liability on third parties who contribute to or
financially benefit from the infringing activities of others.23
Such liability is justified on the grounds that third parties,
who are often responsible for fostering infringing activity by
numerous direct infringers, allow copyright owners a more
efficient means of ending widespread infringement and,
ultimately, satisfying judgments.24
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); see also CRAIG JOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER,
PETER JASZI, & TYLER OCHOA, COPYRIGHT LAW 320-21 (2003) (discussing the
"bundle of rights" concept). The rights vested in the author of a copyrighted
work include the right of reproduction (§ 106(1)), the right to prepare derivative
works (§ 106(2)), the right of distribution (§ 106(3)), and the rights of public
performance (§ 106(4)) and public display (§ 106(5)). 17 U.S.C. § 106. A
copyright is said to be a "bundle" of rights because an author may divest himself
of any § 106 right, in whole or in part (i.e., through an assignment or license),
without alienating any of the remaining rights. See JOYCE ET AL., supra, at 321.
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner as provided by section[] 106 . . .is an infringer of the
copyright. ...").
23. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th
Cir. 1996) (finding a swap meet operator liable as a vicarious infringer for (1)
financially benefiting from the infringing activity of another while (2) having
the right and ability to supervise the place where the infringement occurred);
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162-63
(2d Cir. 1971) (finding a local concert association liable as a contributory
infringer for (1) materially contributing to the public performance of
copyrighted works with (2) knowledge that such performances were infringing).
24. Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of
Hon. Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights) (noting that secondary liability
doctrines "allow copyright owners to focus their enforcement (and licensing)
efforts on those entities that foster infringing activity and have the resources
and wherewithal to either pay licensing fees or satisfy an infringement
judgment, without bringing costly, time-consuming and usually futile actions
against multiple, mostly judgment-proof individual defendants"), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1276&witid=307. A copyright
owner's interest in pursuing a defendant capable of satisfring a judgment
should not be underestimated. The Copyright Act provides owners of registered
copyrights with the option of electing statutory damages at any time prior to
final judgment. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Statutory damages can range from $750
to $30,000 per violation, but can be increased up to $150,000 if the infringement
is proven to be willful. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)-(2). Award amounts based on
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The doctrines of third-party liability are not expressly
codified in the Copyright Act, but they have been held
implicit in § 106's grant of the right "to authorize" uses of
copyrighted works.25 These doctrines have traditionally been
viewed as the product of federal common law, created by
judges and grounded in two intellectually distinct rationales
for liability.26  Vicarious liability, based on the common-law
doctrine of respondeat superior, contemplates liability for
those who stand to benefit financially from the infringement
of others while having the right and ability to supervise such
infringing activity.27 This doctrine of liability is grounded in
basic notions of fairness and reasonableness: a copyright
owner should have some remedy against a party who does not
infringe directly, but who stands to profit from infringing
activity occurring within his or her control.28
Contributory infringement, on the other hand, is rooted
in tort and criminal law analogs distinct from vicarious
infringement. 29  Like the principles of joint and several
liability in tort law and aiding and abetting in criminal law,
contributory infringement imposes liability on those who are
aware of the offending conduct of another, but nevertheless
facilitate that activity."0 The classic formulation of this
doctrine was articulated by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
statutory damages can be staggering. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television,
Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding a lower court award of statutory damages in the amount of
$8,800,000), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 340 (1998). See generally J. Cam
Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-
Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for
Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 ("[Tjhe owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following .... " (emphasis
added)); see also Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088,
1093 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[The addition of the words 'to authorize' in the 1976
[Copyright] Act appears best understood as merely clarifying that the Act
contemplates liability for contributory infringement, and that the bare act of
'authorization' can suffice.").
26. See Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859,
868 (2004).
27. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996);
see also Feder, supra note 26, at 869-71.
28. See Feder, supra note 26, at 870-71.
29. See id. at 871.
30. See id.
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Management, Inc.: "[O]ne who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
'contributory' infringer."3' Thus, a prima facie contributory
infringement claim requires (1) direct infringement, (2)
knowledge of the direct infringement, and (3) material
contribution to that infringement.32
B. Limiting Contributory Liability: The Sony Doctrine
While the contributory liability doctrine is
uncontroversial in many contexts, the threat that the doctrine
poses to emerging technologies ultimately forced courts to
recognize an important limitation on its use. The United
States Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.33 was a milestone in the evolving
doctrine of contributory liability.34  In Sony, owners of the
copyrights in publicly broadcasted television programs
brought suit against Sony, the manufacturer of the Betamax
video recorder, for copyright infringement. The copyright
owners alleged that consumers were purchasing Sony's
Betamax for the purpose of recording copyrighted commercial
television broadcasts and were thereby infringing the
copyrights. 6 They sought to hold Sony liable because it had
marketed and distributed the Betamax to consumers knowing
that at least some of its customers would use the Betamax for
infringing purposes.
The Court's analysis stated that Sony's contributory
liability, if any, would have to be based solely on its sale of
the Betamax with constructive knowledge that some
customers might use the equipment to make infringing
copies. 3 Noting that it was unprecedented in copyright law
31. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
32. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
33. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
34. See David G. Post, His Napster's Voice, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 107, 109-10 (Adam Thierer
& Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr. eds., 2002) (explaining Sony's impact in the context
of the Napster decision).
35. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 439 ("If vicarious liability is to be imposed on [Sony] in this case, it
[Vol: 46
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to hold third parties liable based on mere constructive
knowledge,39 the Court sought to strike a balance between the
interests of copyright owners and the prospective benefits of
new copying technologies.4" The Court struck this balance by
borrowing from a limitation placed on the contributory
liability provision codified in the Patent Act.4' The Court
adopted patent law's "staple article of commerce doctrine"
42
and stated that "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale
of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes."43  The Court went on to state
famously that the product "need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses."44
Applying this standard to the Betamax, the Court, by a
5-4 decision,45 found that Sony could not be held liable for
must rest on the fact that [it] has sold equipment with constructive knowledge
of the fact that [its] customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized
copies of copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for
the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory."). It should be noted that
the Sony Court frequently used "vicarious liability" as a general term for
secondary liability. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1022-23 (9th Cir. 2001). Its use in the quoted language has been generally
accepted as referring to the doctrine of contributory infringement, not vicarious
infringement. Id.
39. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
40. See id. at 442 ("The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a
balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not
merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others
freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.").
41. Id. Unlike the Copyright Act, the Patent Act specifically defines what
constitutes contributory infringement. Id. at 440 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 271).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). The provision states:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States a component of
a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
Id.
43. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
44. Id.
45. While the case was ultimately a 5-4 decision in favor of Sony, personal
papers of Justice Blackmun released after his death confirm that the case had
initially been decided in favor of Universal. See David G. Post et al., "Nice
Questions" Unanswered: Grokster, Sony's Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine,
and the Deferred Verdict on Internet File Sharing, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 235,
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infringement committed by its customers because there was
sufficient evidence to indicate that the Betamax was being
used for substantial unobjectionable purposes.46 Further, the
Court pointed out that there was no ongoing relationship
between Sony and its customers, as such contact was confined
exclusively to the point of sale. Thus, despite its
constructive knowledge of its customers' infringement, Sony
was absolved of any liability for the sale and distribution of
the Betamax.48
C. Appellate Court Application of the Sony Doctrine in File-
Sharing Cases
1. The Ninth Circuit: A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
The first test of the Sony doctrine in an Internet file-
sharing case came in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.49
Numerous record labels sued Napster, a company that
developed file-sharing software based on a centralized peer-
to-peer model,5" for contributory and vicarious copyright
242 n.32 (2005).
46. Sony, 464 U.S. at 443-55 (discussing the home use of the Betamax for
time-shifting purposes as a fair use). One point of contention since Sony has
been whether a full trial record is needed to properly determine the existence of
such substantial noninfringing uses. Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2783 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(finding insufficient evidence of Grokster and StreamCast's substantial
noninfringing uses at the summary judgment stage and distinguishing the
value of Sony based on its being "enlightened by a full trial record"), with id. at
2790 (Breyer, J., concurring) (viewing Sony's full trial record as unimportant,
given that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs on summary judgment would
not likely lead to a different outcome following trial).
47. Sony, 464 U.S. at 437-38.
48. Id. at 456.
49. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
50. For peer-to-peer networks to function, they must make it possible for
users of the software to both locate and share files on the network. The network
does this by compiling an index, which records the names of the shared files
available on users' computers. See Feder, supra note 26, at 863. When a user
then searches the network for a particular file, the index reports whether a file
by that name is available and, if so, provides the user with the Internet address
of that "host" computer. Id. The index thus helps connect the would-be
downloader with a willing file-sharer. See id. Such an indexing function on
peer-to-peer networks can be either centralized or decentralized. Id. at 864.
Centralized networks, like that used by Napster, operate by
maintaining a single index of all files available on the network and the Internet
addresses of the computers on which those files are located. See Hisanari Harry
Tanaka, Post-Napster: Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Systems: Current and Future
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infringement.51 The district court found that Napster had
both actual and constructive knowledge of its users'
infringing activities and thus held that plaintiffs
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits,
warranting a preliminary injunction against Napster.5'
Among the issues raised on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, 3
Napster argued that despite any actual or constructive
knowledge it had of direct infringement, it was shielded from
liability by Sony's limitation on contributory infringement.54
The court examined Sony in light of Napster's product and
determined that it applied insofar as the court would not
impute the requisite level of knowledge for liability merely
because Napster's technology could be used for
infringement. 5 Furthermore, the court considered Napster's
capability for "substantial" or "commercially significant"
noninfringing uses and interpreted Sony as requiring an
evaluation of both the current uses of the product, as well as
uses that may develop over time.56 The court reasoned that if
a product is capable of such potential use, evidence of a
Issues on Secondary Liability Under Copyright Laws in the United States and
Japan, 22 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37, 49 (2001). Each time a user logs into the
network, information about the files available on the user's computer are added
to the central index. See Feder, supra note 26, at 865. This indexing model
ensures that at any given time, a record of all available files being shared on the
peer-to-peer network is accessible to its users. See id.
Decentralized indices have developed in two veins: the node and the
supernode model. See id. Under a node model, each individual peer maintains
an index of the files available on his computer and those computers to which he
has previously connected. See Tanaka, supra, at 49. Thus, the indices under
the node model reflect only a small portion of the total resources being shared
on the network.
The supernode model differs slightly and exists somewhere between the
extremes of a centralized index and a completely decentralized node index.
Feder, supra note 26, at 865. This model, used by Grokster and Kazaa,
delegates the indexing function of a centralized server to numerous supernodes.
Id. The supernodes index the resources available on the nodes of the network
and propagate this information among one another. Id. Ordinary nodes then
access the supernode's index just as they would a centralized index. Id.
51. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1010-11.
52. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
53. Napster unsuccessfully attempted to avoid liability by contending that
its users were making fair use of copyrighted works and were, therefore, not
direct infringers. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
54. Id. at 1020.
55. Id. at 1020-21.
56. Id. at 1021.
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defendant's actual knowledge of specific infringing acts would
be sufficient to overcome Sony's protection.57 "Conversely,"
the court went on, "absent any specific information which
identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator
cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because
the structure of the system allows for the exchange of
copyrighted material."" Despite reading into Sony a
requirement that Napster possess actual knowledge of
specific infringing activity, the court concluded that Napster
had sufficient knowledge, both actual and constructive, of its
users' infringement to satisfy the knowledge element.59
Likewise, the court had little difficulty determining that
Napster satisfied the material contribution prong of the
analysis.6" Napster's centralized index6 provided the support
services necessary for its users' direct infringement.62 By
providing the "site and facilities" for infringement, Napster
satisfied the material contribution element.63
The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the record
companies had presented sufficient evidence of Napster's
contributory and vicarious liability to merit a preliminary
injunction and remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings.64
2. The Seventh Circuit: In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation
As in Napster, the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re
57. See id. at 1021 ("[I]f a computer system operator learns of specific
infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such material
from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement."
(citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995))).
58. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 436, 442-43 (1984)).
59. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022. Evidence of Napster's actual knowledge
included documents authored by its employees indicating that pirated music
was being exchanged on the network. Id. at 1020. It had also received notices
from the Recording Industry Association of America informing it of the
existence of infringing files. Id. at 1020 & n.5.
60. Id. at 1022.
61. See discussion supra note 50.
62. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
63. Id. (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
64. Id. at 1029.
930 [Vol: 46
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Aimster Copyright Litigation65 resulted in a finding of
probable liability for the maker of a peer-to-peer technology.66
The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's preliminary
injunction against file-sharing software maker Aimster after
it found that the copyright-holder plaintiffs had presented
sufficient evidence of contributory liability to succeed on the
merits .
In its evaluation of the knowledge element of the
contributory infringement analysis, the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the district court's finding that Aimster had
knowledge, or at least reason to know, of its users' infringing
activity.6" Judge Richard Posner, writing for the panel, found
that Aimster's use of encryption technology in file transfers,
which had allegedly prevented it from learning the
copyrighted nature of the files being exchanged, amounted to
willful blindness.69  In the context of contributory
infringement, this "self-inflicted wound" amounted to actual
knowledge and did not excuse Aimster from liability.7 °
Aimster sought shelter from liability under Sony's "staple
article of commerce" doctrine. 71 Because the Sony majority
distinguished between current and potential noninfringing
uses, Aimster argued that it was a sufficient defense to show
merely that its file-sharing technology could be used for
noninfringing purposes. 7' Aimster's defense thus relied on
drawing a distinction between the current uses of a
technology and the prospective uses that may develop over
time. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and noted
that such a reading of Sony would eviscerate the significance
of any finding of constructive knowledge and result in a rule
similar to that articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Napster.73
65. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 656.
67. Id. at 653.
68. See id. at 650 (explaining that the defendant must have strongly
suspected that infringing activity was taking place).
69. Id. at 654-55.
70. Id.
71. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 649. The Seventh Circuit expressly disapproved of the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of Sony in Napster. See id. ("We therefore agree ... that
the Ninth Circuit erred in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. in suggesting
that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient condition for
deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer." (citations omitted)).
20061 931
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Such a rule would permit a seller of a product or service made
exclusively for facilitating copyright infringement to escape
all liability upon a mere showing of a prospective
noninfringing use.74
The Seventh Circuit also differentiated Aimster from the
Betamax at issue in Sony. It noted that Aimster was more
like a service than a product, as it maintained a continuing
relationship with its customers after the initial download of
its software.75 Unlike in Sony, where customer contact
existed only at the point of sale,76 Aimster furthered an
ongoing relationship with its customers by providing editorial
content and software updates.77 The Seventh Circuit also
found it significant that the majority in Sony painstakingly
pointed out that the probable time-shifting use of the
Betamax was likely a fair use under copyright law. 8  In
contrast, Aimster's only documented uses were infringing.79
The court further distinguished Sony by examining the
intentions and promotional activities undertaken by Sony and
Aimster. In Sony, the Supreme Court noted that the product
manufacturer's advertising did not encourage infringing use
of the Betamax.8 0  The Seventh Circuit found that this was
not the case for Aimster, as its "club Aimster" feature8' and
tutorial information relied on infringing works to draw
users. 82 Similarly, the court determined that, unlike the
Betamax, Aimster's software was intentionally designed for
the purpose of infringement.83
The Seventh Circuit further indicated that if the product
74. Id. at 651.
75. Id. at 648.
76. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438
(1984).
77. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 653 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
78. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 421, 443); see
discussion infra note 204.
79. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653 ("Absent is any indication from real-life
Aimster users that their primary use of the system is to transfer non-
copyrighted files ....").
80. Id. at 651 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 438).
81. Id. at 652. Club Aimster was an optional fee-based service that
provided Aimster users with instant access to the forty most popular songs
exchanged over the network. Id. These songs were all under copyright. Id.
82. Id. at 651. The court found that "[t]he tutorial is the invitation to
infringement that the Supreme Court found was missing in Sony." Id.
83. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
932 [Vol: 46
COPYFIGHTS TO COME
or service at issue was deemed capable of both substantial
infringing and noninfringing uses, Sony requires that a court
balance the costs and benefits of the infringement before
absolving a defendant of liability. 4  The Aimster court's
balancing test included three factors: (1) the respective
magnitudes of infringing and noninfringing uses; (2) whether
the defendant encouraged the infringing use; and (3) the
defendant's efforts to eliminate or reduce the infringement."5
While the court discussed the Aimster file-sharing application
in light of all three factors, it ultimately declined to apply
Sony because the defendant had failed to offer any proof of
noninfringing uses by real-life Aimster users.8 6
D. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
Following the decisions in Napster and Aimster, peer-to-
peer software developers created a new generation of file-
sharing programs that sought to avoid their predecessors'
legal problems by "designing around" the law of contributory
liability." Recognizing that Napster's fatal flaw was its
centralized indexing system, these second-generation file-
sharing applications used decentralized indices to deprive
their creators of any actual knowledge of infringing activity.8
Two companies, Grokster and StreamCast Networks,
employed these decentralized networks and became
emblematic of this attempt to bypass the contributory
liability doctrine when suit was brought against them. 9
While the product at issue in Grokster, like in Napster and
Aimster, was file-sharing software, the legal dispute was seen
as much broader and more significant to the development of
84. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649. The court emphasized the benefit of such a
test in light of Sony, where it noted that the Betamax's primary purpose
ultimately became a player for purchased or rented videos, not for recording
broadcast programming. Id.
85. Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, 887
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649-5 1).
86. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
87. See Post, supra note 34, at 112.
88. See discussion supra note 50.
89. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259
F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated
and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). Sharman Networks, the maker of
another popular file-sharing application, was also a defendant in the lawsuit,
but withdrew as a party to the motion for summary judgment by Grokster and
StreamCast prior to the district court's judgment. Id. at 1033.
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future interactive technologies.9"
1. Grokster in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Ninth Circuit's Grokster decision was the first time a
federal appellate court ruled in favor of a file-sharing
software company on issues of secondary liability.91 At the
district court level, the software makers successfully
persuaded the court to grant partial summary judgment after
showing that they lacked the requisite knowledge and
material contribution to be liable as contributory infringers."
In its review of the lower court decision, the Ninth
Circuit analyzed Sony's application to the knowledge element
of contributory liability.93 Relying heavily on its Napster
decision, the court determined that whether the alleged
product is capable of substantial or commercially significant
noninfringing uses was a threshold question to the knowledge
element in the contributory liability analysis.94 To satisfy the
knowledge element, if the product at issue was not capable of
substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses,
the copyright owner need only show that the product's maker
had constructive knowledge of infringement.95 However, if
the product was capable of such noninfringing or
commercially viable uses, then the copyright holder must
show that the product's maker had reasonable knowledge of
specific infringing files and failed to act on such knowledge to
prevent infringement.96 The Ninth Circuit treated Sony as a
threshold issue to the knowledge element of its contributory
liability analysis, and thus had to decide whether Grokster
and StreamCast's products were capable of substantial
90. See Phil Kloer, Internet Music Case to Apply on Grand Scale, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Mar. 27, 2005, at 1E.
91. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). The copyright owners in Grokster sought to find the
peer-to-peer software makers liable for both contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement. Id. at 1157. As vicarious liability is beyond the scope of
this comment, only the court's analysis of the contributory infringement issue
will be discussed.
92. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
93. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1060-61.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1161.





Agreeing with the district court, the Ninth Circuit had
little difficulty finding that Grokster and StreamCast had
made products that were at least capable of such
noninfringing uses.98 The court noted that the networks were
used successfully to distribute public domain works99 and
licensed music,' ° and thus rejected the copyright owners'
argument that the vast majority of activity on such networks
was infringing.1"' On the contrary, the court stated that the
Sony standard required only mere capability of substantial
noninfringing use. 10 2  Once it found that Grokster and
StreamCast came within this broad reading of the Sony
doctrine, the court determined that the copyright holders
would have to meet the higher knowledge standard
articulated in Napster-actual knowledge of specific
infringing activity.0 3
After determining that the copyright owners had not
raised sufficient genuine issues of material fact to meet the
knowledge standard, the Ninth Circuit found the peer-to-peer
network architecture and timing of any actual knowledge
acquired dispositive. 10 4  With respect to timing, the court
endorsed the district court's conclusion that any "reasonable
knowledge of specific infringement" had to have been
97. See id. ("Thus, in order to analyze the required element of knowledge of
infringement, we must first determine what level of knowledge to require.").
98. See id. at 1161-62 ("Software Distributors have not only shown that
their products are capable of substantial noninfringing uses, but that the uses
have commercial viability.").
99. While discussing file-sharing capabilities beyond audio recordings, the
court noted the use of the networks to share literary works available through
Project Gutenberg and historic public domain files from the Prelinger Archive.
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161.
100. The court was particularly impressed by the popular band Wilco, which
legally distributed an album over defendants' peer-to-peer networks after its
record company declined to release the album. Id. The popularity of the album
led to widespread interest in the band and resulted in their signing with a new
record company. Id.
101. Id. at 1162.
102. See id. ("[I]n order for limitations imposed by Sony to apply, a product
need only be capable of substantial noninfringing uses." (citing A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001)).
103. Id. The full test adopted in Napster requires that the defendant (1)
receive reasonable knowledge of specific infringing act, (2) know or should know
that such files are available on the system, and (3) fails to act to prevent viral
distribution of the works. See id. at 1161 n.7 (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027).
104. Id. at 1162-63.
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acquired "at a time at which they contribute [d] to the
infringement... ."105 Copyright owners' notices 10 6  of
infringing content to Grokster and StreamCast were thus
determined to be "irrelevant" because "they arrive[d] when
Defendants [could] do nothing to facilitate, and [could not] do
anything to stop, the alleged infringement." 107  This
conclusion was largely based on the architecture of the
Grokster and StreamCast networks, which employed a
decentralized indexing system. 08  Unlike the centralized
index in Napster, the decentralized index used by Grokster
and StreamCast prevented the companies from having the
ability to control infringing activity once users installed the
software. 0 9  As the court stated, "even if the Software
Distributors 'closed their doors and deactivated all computers
within their control, users of their products could continue
sharing files with little or no interruption.""' 0
Next, the Ninth Circuit turned to the material
contribution prong of the analysis and again agreed with the
district court's finding that Grokster and StreamCast did not
materially contribute to copyright infringement.1 As with
the knowledge prong, the court placed considerable emphasis
on the architecture of the peer-to-peer networks at issue.112
In comparison to Napster's network, the court noted that
while Napster maintained an "integrated service" that
provided the "site and facilities" for infringement, defendants
had not.'13 Grokster and StreamCast did not have computers
containing infringing messages or indices, nor did they have
the ability to restrict infringing users' access to the
network.1 Significantly, the court found that it was the
software's users, not its developers, who created the network
105. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2003)).
106. Plaintiff copyright owners had provided Grokster and StreamCast with
over 12,000 notices informing them of specific infringing content being traded
on their networks. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
107. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1037).
108. Id. at 1163; see discussion supra note 50.
109. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.




114. Id. (citing Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1037, 1039-41).
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and provided such access. 115  Absent control over the
infringing files or indices, or the ability to regulate access, the
court was unable to find that Grokster or StreamCast
materially contributed to copyright infringement. 116
2. Grokster in the U.S. Supreme Court
Observers of the lower court proceedings in Grokster
were surprised by the Ninth Circuit's reading of Sony and its
refusal to allow the action to proceed to trial.'17 Viewing the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Sony in Napster as the
linchpin of court's decision, parties on both sides of the case
anticipated that the U.S. Supreme Court's grant of certiorari
indicated an intent to revisit Sony and, in the process, resolve
the doctrine's inconsistent application between the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits."8 The Justices, however, ultimately
avoided this review of Sony and decided the case on a new
theory of liability.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the
Ninth Circuit decision." 9 Rather than ruling on the basis of
the contributory or vicarious infringement theories raised in
the lower courts, the Court disposed of the case by instead
adopting an active inducement theory of liability."' Writing
115. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
116. Id. at 1164. The court went on to analyze the plaintiffs' claim that
defendants were vicariously liable for their users' infringing activity. Id. The
two elements required to prove a vicarious liability claim are (1) direct financial
benefit as a result of the infringing activity and (2) the right and ability to
supervise the infringers. Id. (citing Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d
259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)). That defendants were benefiting financially was not
disputed. Id. Like the material contribution element of the contributory
infringement analysis, the court found that defendants did not meet the "right
and ability to supervise" requirement largely because of the architecture of their
decentralized fie-sharing networks. See id. at 1165.
117. See John Borland, Judges Rule File-Sharing Software Legal, CNET
NEWS.COM, Aug. 19, 2004.
118. See John Borland, Supreme Court to Hear P2P Case, CNET NEWS.COM,
Dec. 10, 2004 [hereinafter Borland, Supreme Court to Hear P2P Case].
119. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2783 (2005).
120. See id. at 2780. Like the Court's adoption of the staple article of
commerce doctrine in Sony, see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text, the
Court in Grokster adopted the theory of inducement by borrowing from its
codified equivalent in the Patent Act. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779-80 ("For
the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine from patent law as a
model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible
one for copyright."); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (making liable those who induce
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for the Court, Justice Souter held that "one who distributes a
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting
acts of infringement by third parties."121
The Court evaluated Grokster and StreamCast's
culpability under the inducement test and identified three
types of evidence that were relevant in its application.122
First, the Court stated that evidence of a defendant's aim to
satisfy a known market demand for copyright infringement
would suggest an intent to induce, and the defendants'
interest in capturing the market of former Napster users met
this criterion. 123 Second, the Court found that a defendant's
failure to diminish infringing activity also suggests an
unlawful objective. 124  Both Napster and StreamCast had
refused, or asserted their inability, to modify their software to
filter out known copyrighted files. 2 5  Finally, the Court
suggested that if a defendant's profit potential is tied to the
volume of infringing use, that too would suggest an unlawful
objective. 26 Such a business model was evident in Grokster,
as both StreamCast's and Grokster's revenues and file-
sharing volume had proportionally increased.1 21 Using these
three factors as non-exclusive guidelines to determine
the infringement of a patent).
Reports about the Grokster decision framed the inducement theory as
novel and hitherto unknown in copyright law. See, e.g., Tom Zeller, Jr., The
Supreme Court: The File Sharers; Trying to Tame an Unruly Technology, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 28, 2005, at C1. What these accounts failed to recognize, however,
is that inducement had been an acknowledged theory of liability under the
doctrine of contributory liability for over thirty years prior to Grokster. See
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("[Olne who.., induces, causes, or materially contributes ... may be
held liable as a 'contributory' infringer." (emphasis added)). One could thus
view the Court's holding in Grokster as simply resurrecting a subsumed basis
for liability under the contributory liability doctrine and fashioning it as a
stand-alone theory.
121. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
122. Id. at 2781.
123. Id.
124. Id. Notably, the Court's discussion of this second factor includes a
footnote suggesting that absent other evidence of intent, the failure of a
defendant to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement would not alone be
sufficient to impose inducement liability. Id. at 2781 n.12.
125. See id. at 2781.
126. Id. at 2781-82.
127. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2782.
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whether inducement had occurred, the Court found that
MGM raised issues of material fact sufficient to withstand
Grokster's motion for summary judgment.2 '
Because it adopted an inducement theory, the opinion of
the Court did not discuss how Sony would apply to the
defendants under a contributory infringement analysis.'29
Two concurring opinions, however, broached the issue of
whether Sony would apply to Grokster and StreamCast,
absent evidence of intent to induce infringement.
According to Justice Ginsburg, writing on behalf of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, Grokster and
StreamCast failed to proffer adequate evidence that there
was no issue of material fact on the issue of contributory
infringement. 130 Emphasizing that Sony was decided with the
benefit of a full trial record, Justice Ginsburg criticized the
Ninth Circuit for granting summary judgment based largely
on the defendants' own declarations.' 3' Further, Justice
Ginsburg believed that the number of noninfringing files
available on the networks was insufficient to bring Grokster
and StreamCast within the protection of Sony because this
proportion was dwarfed by the sheer volume of files shared. 32
The evidence in support of the motions for summary
judgment showed that the products were "overwhelmingly
used to infringe," and, thus, Justice Ginsburg stated that
triable issues of fact would have to be resolved before
defendants could avail themselves of Sony's safe harbor.1 33
On the other hand, Justice Breyer and two other
Justices, 3 1 found that defendants' evidence of their products'
128. See id. at 2782 ("There is substantial evidence in MGM's favor on all
elements of inducement, and summary judgment in favor of Grokster and
StreamCast was error.").
129. See id. at 2776 n.9, 2778.
130. See id. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 2785 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
the Ninth Circuit's reliance on these declarations was faulty, as some included
inadmissible hearsay. See id.
132. See id. at 2786 ("Even if the absolute number of noninfringing files
copied using the Grokster and StreamCast software is large, it does not follow
that the products are therefore put to substantial noninfringing uses and are
thus immune from liability. The number of noninfringing copies may be
reflective of, and dwarfed by, the huge total volume of files shared.") (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
133. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2786 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
134. Both Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor joined in Justice- Breyer's
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uses would be sufficient to implicate the protections of
Sony. 135 Comparing the evidence before the Court in Sony to
that before the district court in Grokster, Justice Breyer noted
that in both cases witnesses had failed to quantify the
number of noninfringing uses, yet in Sony the evidence was
sufficient to absolve the product manufacturer of liability.
136
Similarly, Justice Breyer reasoned that the quantities of
lawful use by Grokster and StreamCast roughly
approximated those in Sony and, at the very least, the
plaintiffs had failed to offer sufficient contradictory
evidence. 37  On balance, Justice Breyer concluded that
Grokster's and StreamCast's products were indeed "capable of
substantial and commercially significant noninfringing
uses."
138
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S PROBLEMATIC CONTRIBUTORY
LIABILITY ANALYSIS AFTER GROKSTER
The Ninth Circuit's Napster decision interpreted Sony to
require consideration of a product's capability for
noninfringing uses as a threshold issue to a prima facie case
for contributory copyright infringement. 139 In virtually every
case, this would require proving actual knowledge of specific
infringing acts at a time when the defendant could prevent
the direct infringement. 40  Protection under Sony in the
Ninth Circuit was thus invariably linked to a plaintiffs
inability to prove actual knowledge.
When the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Grokster and rejected its interpretation of Sony,
the Court failed to provide guidance on the relevance of a
defendant's actual knowledge of infringement, particularly in
cases that lack the evidence necessary to meet the Court's
concurring opinion. Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring).
135. See id. at 2787-88 (Breyer, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 2788 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer's discussion of
witness specificity as to the quantity of noninfringing files is a direct response
to Justice Ginsburg's attack on the sufficiency of the defendants' declarations
and supporting evidence. See id. at 2786 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 2788 ("When measured against Sony's underlying evidence and
analysis, the evidence now before use shows that Grokster passes Sony's
test. . . .") (Breyer, J., concurring).
139. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
140. See Feder, supra note 26, at 895.
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newly adopted inducement theory of liability. As a result of
Grokster, the relevance of a defendant's actual knowledge of
infringement and the relationship of that evidence to the
scope of Sony's protection is called into question. This
comment addresses the question of what remains of the Ninth
Circuit's contributory copyright infringement test after
Grokster and, specifically, whether evidence of a defendant's
actual knowledge of direct infringement precludes Sony's
applicability.
IV. ANALYSIS
This part compares the Ninth and Seventh Circuit's pre-
Grokster applications of Sony in the contributory liability
framework and places particular emphasis on the Napster
and Aimster opinions. 4 1  Next, this part examines the
Supreme Court's Grokster opinion, which held that the Ninth
Circuit's understanding of Sony was flawed, and highlights
an unresolved question implicit in the Court's analysis that
will become increasingly problematic in future contributory
infringement actions.1 42 This part then discusses Perfect 10 v.
Google, Inc., a case decided after Grokster under Ninth
Circuit precedent, which illustrates the present dilemma over
how evidence of actual knowledge of infringement should be
considered by courts when evaluating whether Sony's
protection applies to a "good faith" innovator.1 43 Finally, this
part explains the importance of clarifying the contributory
infringement standard and illustrates why litigation over the
"inverse Grokster" scenario will likely replace file-sharing
disputes as the next "copyfight" of the participation age. 4 4
A. Circuit Court Approaches to Sony Before Grokster
The Ninth Circuit's Napster decision began a dispute
among the circuit courts over how Sony should apply within
the contributory liability analysis. Though the Ninth Circuit
ultimately affirmed Napster's liability because the company
possessed both actual and constructive knowledge of its
users' infringement and had materially contributed to that
141. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
142. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
143. See discussion infra Part V.C.
144. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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infringement, 145  its interpretation of Sony established
precedent in the Ninth Circuit that plaintiffs would be
required to demonstrate a higher standard of knowledge by
defendants for contributory liability to attach if the product at
issue is capable of substantial noninfringing uses.1 46 That is,
evidence that a product can be used for substantial,
legitimate purposes provides protection for an accused
infringer under the Ninth Circuit's reading of Sony. Once a
product had met this threshold of capability, constructive
knowledge of infringing activity would be insufficient to
impose liability, and the copyright owner would have to prove
that the accused infringer had actual knowledge of specific
infringing activity at a time when such activity could have
been prevented.1 47 The Ninth Circuit thus determined that to
prevent defendants from avoiding liability under Sony,
plaintiffs must satisfy a greater evidentiary burden with
respect to the knowledge element of the contributory
infringement analysis. 4 '
Though a seemingly viable framework for analyzing an
accused infringer's liability under Sony, the Ninth Circuit's
approach was criticized by a sister court 49 and, ultimately,
rejected by the Supreme Court in Grokster.5 ° The Ninth
Circuit read Sony as requiring only that a device be capable of
substantial noninfringing use and effectively imposed on the
accused infringer an obligation merely to indicate that some
use of his product could be legitimate. While a certain level
of deference to technological innovation is essential to prevent
expansion of copyright interests beyond their proper scope, 5'
145. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
146. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that under Napster's construction of Sony, "if
substantial noninfringing use [is] shown, the copyright owner would be required
to show that the defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing
files" (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027)).
147. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027; see also Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161-62.
148. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160 ("In Napster I, we construed Sony-
Betamax to apply to the knowledge element of contributory copyright
infringement."). L
149. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003)
(indicating the court's agreement that the Ninth Circuit had erred in its
interpretation of Sony).
150. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2778-79 (2005).
151. In its discussion of the codified contributory liability doctrine in patent
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the requirement of showing just some legitimate use to come
within Sony's safe harbor was effectively no requirement at
all. As Judge Posner indicated in his Aimster opinion, "[w]ere
that the law, the seller of a product or service used solely to
facilitate copyright infringement, though it was capable in
principle of noninfringing uses, would be immune from
liability for contributory infringement."15 2
The Seventh Circuit, which decided Aimster just two
years after Napster, deviated significantly from the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of Sony in both the evidentiary
burden shouldered by the defendant asserting Sony's
protection and the effect of Sony's protection on the
contributory liability analysis. While the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that an accused infringer could avail himself of
Sony's protection by merely showing that the product was
capable of current or prospective substantial noninfringing
uses,'53 the Seventh Circuit interpreted Sony's scope much
more narrowly. Judge Posner evaluated the file-sharing
system at issue in Aimster and found it obvious that the
"system could be used in noninfringing ways,' 1 5'4 but reasoned
that Sony required more than a physical capability of the
product or service to be used for noninfringing purposes.1 5
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, which adhered to the literal
language of Sony and thus required only evidence of a
product's capability of substantial noninfringing uses, the
Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Sony required that
accused infringers provide evidence that such uses are
"probable."56
With respect to the varying contributory infringement
analyses of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits prior to Grokster,
most significant was the effect of Sony's application to an
accused product. Under the Ninth Circuit view, once an
law, the Court in Sony explained the reasoning underlying the doctrine and how
that reasoning could equally apply in the context of copyright law. See Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 (1984) ("Indeed, a
finding of contributory infringement is normally the functional equivalent of
holding that the disputed article is within the monopoly granted to the
patentee.").
152. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651.
153. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
154. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651.
155. Id. at 653.
156. Id.
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accused infringer demonstrated that his product was capable
of legitimate use, Sony's protection was invoked and the
copyright owner would have to show a higher level of
knowledge by the accused infringer for liability to result."7
Rather than imposing on the copyright owner the
requirement of showing the accused infringer's actual,
specific knowledge of infringement, the Seventh Circuit found
that Sony would absolve the accused infringer of contributory
liability entirely, provided that the benefits of the product at
issue outweighed the costs in terms of infringing activity. 5 '
By applying a three-factor balancing test instead of imposing
a higher knowledge threshold, the Seventh Circuit evaluated
Sony's applicability independent of the contributory
infringement knowledge element.
B. Unequivocal Equivocation: Questions Answered and
Raised by Grokster
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Grokster
suggested to many that the Court had taken the case to
clarify Sony's application to digital technologies.'59 Both
copyright owners and developers of new technology viewed
Sony's "capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses" language 16' as the key to resolving the case and,
further, to defining the bounds of acceptable, legitimate use of
emerging technologies.' The parties were thus focused on
the issue of whether Sony applies, not the effect of Sony's
application on the contributory infringement analysis.
To the dismay of observers interested in this "whether"
question, the Court ultimately avoided identifying the
quantum of use that would or would not be acceptable. 2
However, in its discussion of the Ninth Circuit's erroneous
interpretation of Sony, the Court did provide some guidance
157. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027.
158. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
159. See Borland, Supreme Court to Hear P2P Case, supra note 118.
160. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
161. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2778 (2005).
162. Id. ("[Wle do not revisit Sony further . . . to add a more quantified
description of the point of balance between protection and commerce when




on the question of Sony's effect on the contributory
infringement analysis. 163 Paraphrasing Sony's holding, the
Court stated that "Sony barred secondary liability based on
presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely
from the design or distribution of a product capable of
substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact
used for infringement."'64 The Court reasoned that the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of Sony, which required that
copyright owners show actual knowledge of specific infringing
activity, "convert[ed] the case from one about liability resting
on imputed intent to one about liability on any theory."1 65 It
explained further:
[The Ninth Circuit] read the rule as being this broad, even
when an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown
by evidence independent of design and distribution of the
product, unless the distributors had "specific knowledge of
infringement at a time at which they contributed to the
infringement, and failed to act upon that information."' 66
With respect to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation that
Sony required a higher standard of knowledge in the case of a
product capable of substantial noninfringing uses, the Court
thus found the Ninth Circuit analysis inconsistent with
Sony. 67 However, the Court neglected to specify what effect,
if any, evidence of actual knowledge of specific infringing acts
would have on Sony's limitation of imputed or presumed
intent based on product design or distribution.
The Court's restatement of the Sony doctrine and its
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's error raise two questions
about Sony's effect on the contributory liability analysis.
First, if an accused infringer has no actual knowledge of
specific acts of infringement, but there is "evidence
independent of design and distribution of the product"168
suggesting a purpose to cause infringement, does contributory
liability result? Second, if there is no such evidence




166. Id. (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380
F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004)).
167. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
168. Id.
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purpose to infringe copyrights, but the accused infringer has
actual knowledge of specific infringing acts, how does this
evidence impact the accused infringer's liability under Sony?
The Court clearly answered the first question in the
affirmative by adopting the active inducement theory. 169 Both
Grokster and StreamCast designed file-sharing software that
functioned without a central server, thereby preventing them
from acquiring actual knowledge of specific unlawful uses of
their software.17 ° But unlike Sony, the defendants in Grokster
went beyond the mere design or distribution of the software.
The Grokster defendants had marketed their products to take
advantage of a demand for illegal file-sharing services,
neglected to act to prevent future infringement once notified
of illegal activity, and tied their business revenues to the
volume of downloads on their networks. 17  The Court used
these factors to craft the inducement theory of liability, which
makes clear that contributory liability will attach in the
absence of actual knowledge if other evidence suggests a
purpose to cause infringement.1 72
The second question raised by the Court's discussion of
Sony remains unanswered. This is the inverse situation of
that raised in Grokster, whereby a product developer, without
intent to induce or to otherwise cause infringement, makes
and distributes a product after acquiring actual knowledge of
specific acts of infringement. Grokster is silent on the effect
of such actual knowledge of a good-faith innovator under
Sony in this "inverse Grokster" scenario.
Though Sony clearly does not mandate proof of the
accused infringer's actual knowledge of infringement after
Grokster,173 the question of whether such knowledge
completely eliminates a safe harbor under Sony is critically
important under the Ninth Circuit's analysis. The Ninth
Circuit has applied Sony to the knowledge element of the
contributory liability analysis since Napster,174 and the
169. See id. at 2779-80.
170. Id. at 2770-74 (describing the Grokster and StreamCast software).
171. Id. at 2781-82 (discussing the three indicia of culpable intent under the
inducement theory).
172. Id. at 2781-82 & n.13.
173. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.




Supreme Court never expressly rejected this approach in
Grokster. The Court did, however, reject the Ninth Circuit's
requirement that a copyright owner show actual knowledge of
specific infringing acts once a product is found capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. 7 5 After Grokster, the Sony
rule clearly seems to establish that for a product capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, constructive knowledge alone
(i.e., knowledge imputed or presumed from mere design or
distribution) is insufficient to support a claim for contributory
infringement. 176  What remains unclear is whether actual
knowledge of specific infringing acts, which was the required
showing in the Ninth Circuit's analysis under Napster, is
sufficient after Grokster to deprive a non-inducing, good-faith
innovator of Sony's protection.
C. The Ninth Circuit's Sony Analysis After Grokster:
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc.
The Ninth Circuit has yet to clarify how actual
knowledge will impact its contributory infringement analysis
of a good-faith innovator under the "inverse Grokster"
scenario. One recent published district court decision
illustrates the void that currently exists in the Ninth Circuit's
contributory liability analysis because of this question left
lingering after Grokster.
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc.177 involved a dispute between
the popular Internet search engine Google and the publisher
of an adult magazine that maintains a subscription website
containing copyrighted images.'78 At issue was Google's
"Google Images" feature, which uses the Google search
technology to scour the Internet for images that depict the
query inputted by a user into the Google website.'79 The
results of the search are returned as a grid of "thumbnail"
images, which in turn link the user to the particular website
from which the picture was copied and reduced to
"thumbnail" size.'8 0 Among the images searchable by Google
were those belonging to Perfect 10 that had been reproduced
175. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
176. See id.
177. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
178. Id. at 831-32.
179. Id. at 832-33.
180. Id. at 833.
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by direct infringers in violation of its copyrights and posted to
third-party websites unaffiliated with Perfect 10.8 Perfect
10 sought to hold Google liable for, among other theories,
contributory infringement. 8 2  Google defended by claiming
that it could not be held liable as a contributory infringer
under Sony. 183
The Perfect 10 decision was the first time since Grokster
that a district court within the Ninth Circuit had considered
Sony's application to the contributory liability analysis.
Importantly, this case involved the "inverse Grokster"
scenario discussed above: a good-faith innovator (Google),
without intent to induce or cause infringement, designed and
distributed a product capable of substantial noninfringing
uses with actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement
(direct infringement of Perfect 10's copyrighted images by
third parties)."8 4
The court's decision was representative of the
uncertainty over how the "inverse Grokster" set of facts
should be decided under the Ninth Circuit's traditional
contributory liability analysis. The court evaluated Google's
defense under Sony and determined that Google could not be
charged with constructive knowledge of the infringing activity
because its search engine was capable of noninfringing
uses."'5 Noting the Grokster Court's admonition that Sony
would not bar liability "'where evidence goes beyond a
product's characteristics ... and shows statements or actions
directed to promoting infringement,"'1 6 the court then quoted
key language from the Ninth Circuit's Napster decision,
stating that "'actual, specific knowledge of direct
infringement renders Sony's holding of limited assistance' to
a defendant seeking to avoid contributory liability."18 7
181. See id. at 831.
182. See id.
183. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 853.
184. See generally id. at 853-56.
185. Id. at 853. Notably, the court found that Google's product had come
within Sony's safe harbor without any discussion of the quantity of infringing
versus noninfringing image files available through the image search. Cf Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2786 (2005)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance of weighing the relative
number of infringing and noninfringing files made available).
186. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 853 (quoting Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779).




Interestingly, after evaluating evidence of Google's actual
knowledge of the direct infringement, the court declined to
decide the issue of whether Google had such knowledge;
instead, it assumed that such knowledge existed so that it
could proceed to the material contribution prong of the
contributory liability analysis.88 In the process, the court
seemingly disregarded any obligation to discuss how Google's
actual knowledge of specific infringement would impact its
claim of non-liability under Sony.
The Perfect 10 court's reference to the Napster language
of "actual, specific knowledge" 1 9 as limiting Sony's assistance
suggests that even if actual knowledge is found, it may not
preclude Sony's protection. If Ninth Circuit courts interpret
the effect of actual knowledge in this manner, then the
permissive nature of the "actual knowledge factor" suggests
the use of a balancing test to determine whether the degree of
knowledge, in combination with other factors, outweighs the
policy interests for protection under Sony.
D. Copyfights to Come: Implications of the "Inverse Grokster"
Scenario
The most recent copyfight culminated in the defeat of
illicit file-sharing networks in Grokster, and Perfect 10
suggests that the next great battleground will be over
technologies characterized by the "inverse Grokster" scenerio.
These disputes will pit content owners against legitimate
organizations seeking to capitalize on the demand for
interactivity, rather than overt peddlers of technologies
intended to deliver pirated works. They will involve
consumer-oriented technology companies, such as Google,
MySpace,1 90 and YouTube,' 9 ' that conduct their businesses
188. Id. at 854. The court likely avoided a discussion of the actual knowledge
prong of the contributory infringement analysis because the material
contribution prong was so decidedly in Google's favor. See id. As both prongs
must be met to establish liability, the court likely thought it best to avoid the
legal uncertainty of the knowledge issue and instead base its rejection of Perfect
10's claim on less-disputed material contribution grounds.
189. Id. at 853.
190. MySpace is a social networking website that bills itself as an "online
community that lets you meet your friends' friends." About Us-MySpace.com,
httpJ/www.myspace.com/Modules/Common/Pages/AboutUs.aspx (last visited
Aug. 31, 2006). Members can post messages and multimedia content, including
copyrighted photos and videos, on their homepages, which are visible to other
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without the apparent evidence of "statements or actions
directed to promote infringement," yet admittedly maintain
day-to-day operations with varying degrees of actual
knowledge of direct infringement by users of their services.'92
As Justice Breyer aptly stated in his concurring opinion in
Grokster: "Sony's standard seeks to protect not the Groksters
of this world. . ., but the development of technology more
generally. And Grokster's desires in this respect are beside
the point."'93
Because of the interests at stake in this future area of
debate over Sony's application, it will be important to fill the
ongoing void in the Ninth Circuit's contributory liability.
Since the Supreme Court declined to elaborate on the
relevance of actual knowledge of specific infringing acts in the
case of a good-faith innovator, the Ninth Circuit must
reconcile its jurisprudence under Napster with the Supreme
Court's guidance in Grokster on the proper role of Sony in the
contributory liability analysis. With its interpretation of the
mandated actual knowledge standard expressly rejected by
the Court, the Ninth Circuit must consider whether a
balancing test, similar to that developed by the Seventh
Circuit in Aimster, comports with Sony and better weighs
evidence of actual knowledge in the contributory liability
analysis.
members and the public. See Old Mogul, New Media, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 21,
2006, at 68 (discussing MySpace in the context of the company's acquisition by
Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation).
191. YouTube is a website that allows "people to watch and share original
videos worldwide through a Web experience." About YouTube,
http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Aug. 31, 2006). While many videos
on the site are home-made and submitted legally by copyright-owner-creators, a
significant number are user-captured television or movie clips that are uploaded
without the copyright owner's authorization.
192. See Chmielewski, supra note 9, at C1 (discussing YouTube's aggressive
use policy aimed at keeping pirated videos off the site, but noting YouTube's
clear benefit from increased traffic to the site when a popular video is posted in
violation of copyright). Recently, a lawsuit was filed against YouTube by a
journalist claiming that his video documenting the 1992 Los Angeles riots had
been posted to YouTube and viewed more than 1,000 times without his
permission. See Xenia P. Kobylarz, Watching the Whirlwind, THE RECORDER,
Aug. 9, 2006. The case raises the question of what level of responsibility
YouTube has to police its own site for infringing material. See id. This case
typifies the "inverse Grokster" dilemma and will likely be only the first of many
similar suits to be filed in this new type of copyfight.
193. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2790 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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V. RESOLVING THE "INVERSE GROKSTER" DILEMMA: A
PROPOSED TEST FOR CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT IN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
This comment proposes that the Ninth Circuit recast its
contributory infringement analysis under Sony by setting
forth a balancing test to ascertain the liability of a good-faith
innovator who has actual knowledge of specific acts of direct
infringement-what this comment refers to as the "inverse
Grokster" scenario. Modeled after the balancing test
developed by Judge Posner in Aimster,194 the proposed
balancing test modifies the Seventh Circuit approach by
removing or lessening the significance of factors subsumed
within the inducement theory of liability announced in
Grokster.19'
Like the Seventh Circuit approach, the proposed test
begins with Sony's standard inquiry of whether the accused
product is "capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses."196  Unlike the Seventh Circuit, however, capability
would be judged more leniently to take into account uses that
develop over time.' 97 This flexible capability standard would
be consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent and the approach
advocated by Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in
Grokster. 198
194. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
195. These inducement-oriented factors are intended to probe the innovator's
activities that might be seen as encouraging infringement. See, e.g., Monotype
Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, 888 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see
also Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
196. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
197. This is contrasted with the more rigorous "probable uses" standard
announced by the Seventh Circuit in Aimster. See In re Aimster Copyright
Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003). After Grokster, it is questionable
whether probable use is consistent with Sony, as the Court's majority opinion
made repeated reference to the "capability" language of Sony, even when
rephrasing that case's holding, and never suggested that capability should be
read more narrowly. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778. Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, went so far as to state
expressly that the Seventh Circuit had interpreted Sony more strictly than he
would have. Id. at 2790 (Breyer, J., concurring).
198. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir.
2001) (noting the lower court's error in improperly confining the use analysis to
current uses, as compared to the current and future noninfringing uses);
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Importantly, Sony also
used the word 'capable,' when asking whether the product is 'capable of
substantial noninfringing uses.").
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An accused third-party infringer would not be presumed
liable if it could provide evidence demonstrating substantial
current or future noninfringing uses. Unlike the Ninth
Circuit's reading of Sony in Napster,199 once a product is
deemed to fall within Sony's safe harbor under the proposed
test, the presumption of non-liability would arise as to the
charge of contributory infringement generally, not just as to
the element of knowledge. By removing the Sony analysis
from the knowledge element, the Ninth Circuit's analysis
would be more consistent with the Seventh Circuit's Aimster
approach, which evaluates Sony independent of the elements
of contributory infringement. °°
The proposed test is also similar to the Seventh Circuit's
approach in that upon showing that the product is capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, it would require that the
court balance four factors to determine whether the
presumption of non-liability is overcome by other evidence.2°1
The court should consider the following factors: (1) the
accused third-party infringer's actual knowledge of specific
acts of infringement concurrent with the sale of the product
or service, (2) the respective magnitudes of infringing and
noninfringing uses, (3) the accused infringer's efforts to
eliminate or reduce infringement, and (4) the public's interest
in the product or service giving rise to the infringing
conduct. °2
The first factor is relevant to the evidentiary standard a
plaintiff must meet under Napster's interpretation of Sony:
whether the accused infringer had knowledge of specific
infringing acts at a time when he could have acted to prevent
such infringement. °3 In Napster, the Ninth Circuit suggested
199. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
200. See generally In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2003).
201. See id. at 649 ("What is true is that when a supplier is offering a product
or service that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of
the respective magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of
contributory infringement.").
202. Two of these factors are derived from the Seventh Circuit's balancing
test set forth in Aimster: the respective magnitudes of infringing and
noninfringing use and the efforts of the accused infringer to eliminate or reduce
infringement. See Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d
877, 887-88 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (enumerating the factors set forth in Aimster, 334
F.3d at 649-51).
203. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
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that a finding of actual knowledge rendered Sony of limited
assistance, but it did not rule out the possibility that such
knowledge could be overcome by other considerations. This
makes evidence of knowledge particularly useful in a
balancing test that seeks to weigh not just an accused
infringer's awareness of unlawful activity, but also the
countervailing benefits of the underlying technology.
Like the Aimster court's balancing test, the proposed
second factor addresses the respective magnitudes of
infringing and noninfringing uses. The magnitude-of-use
factor seeks to weigh the volume of infringing versus
noninfringing uses of the product and considers the amount of
such allegedly infringing use that might constitute fair use.20 4
This factor allows a court to consider trends in the use of the
technology and recognize new primary uses that are
legitimate.2 °5
Similar to the second factor, the proposed third factor,
the accused infringer's efforts to eliminate or reduce
infringement, derives from the Seventh Circuit's balancing
test.20 6  This factor complements the first factor's
consideration of actual knowledge, wherein it potentially
mitigates a finding of actual knowledge if the accused
infringer had policies or systems in place to prevent
infringement upon the acquisition of such knowledge. This
factor also serves to reinforce the accused infringer's status as
a good-faith innovator where evidence of disregard of
infringing activity would otherwise suggest bad faith, though
not necessarily to the level of inducement.2 7
204. Fair use under copyright law requires courts to balance four factors
between the alleged infringer and the party asserting fair use: (1) the purpose
and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount
of the work used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2000); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see
also Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (applying the § 107
fair use test to Google's website caching technology).
205. For example, the Aimster court noted that the cost-benefit analysis in
Sony seemed prescient once the home video rental market emerged following
widespread consumer adoption of the VCR, the technology at issue in Sony. See
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649-50.
206. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
207. An alleged infringer's failure to act to prevent infringement, while in
bad faith, would not be sufficient to impose liability under the inducement
standard set forth in Grokster. As the Supreme Court indicated, inducement
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Finally, the proposed balancing test should include a
factor that accounts for the public interest. This factor is
especially important for accused third-party infringers who
fall into the "inverse Grokster" scenario, as these parties are
often large-scale innovators that develop products of
undoubted public benefit. One need look no further than the
products Google develops based on its search technology to
appreciate the public benefit that may outweigh other factors
suggesting contributory infringement. °8 Of course, any court
requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement.. .. " Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.
Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005) (emphasis added). Further, the Court expressly noted
that mere failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement would not be
sufficient to impose contributory liability. Id. at 2781.
208. Google's controversial "Google Book Search" feature is a good example of
a situation in which the public's interest in a promising copying technology
should be weighed against a copyright owner's property right. In conjunction
with the University of California, Harvard University, and the New York Public
Library, among other institutions, Google has undertaken to scan and index its
partners' entire library collections. Tim O'Reilly, Search and Rescue, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at A27. The books scanned are fully searchable from
Google's site, which allows Google users to read excerpts of the books containing
their search query. See id.
While some content owners, most notably the Authors Guild, have
steadfastly opposed Google's plans and have alleged the company of copyright
infringement, Google and its supporters view the project as a means of creating
a market for obscure works. See id. More noteworthy, however, is the potential
that these digital libraries have for ground-breaking research in both the arts
and sciences that could yield significant benefits for the public at large. See id.
"In this new world, people will make connections between information and ideas
that were hitherto inaccessible, driving the pace of innovation in all areas of
life-academic, economic, and civic-and enhancing the use of the world's great
libraries." Google Book Search Library Partners,
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/partners.html (quoting Daniel Greenstein,
University of California Associate Vice Provost for Scholarly Information and
University Librarian).
Google has defended the legality of the Book Search project as a fair use.
O'Reilly, supra, at A27. A recent district court case, Field v. Google, 412 F.
Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006), may bolster Google's argument. Though the case
dealt with Google's website caching technology, not its Book Search program,
Field's discussion of fair use suggested that Google's good faith and the
transformative nature of the caching feature were significant in evaluating the
statutory four-factor fair use test. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1118-19, 1122-23;
see discussion supra note 204. Field's fair use discussion, hinting at the public
benefit of Google's caching technology and noting Google's good faith, echoes the
contributory infringement analysis for similar "inverse Grokster" scenarios
proposed by this comment. For a discussion of the Field court's fair use analysis
and its applicability to the Google Book Search project, see Dan Cohen, Impact
of Field v. Google on the Google Library Project, Dan Cohen: Digital Humanities
Blog,
COPYFIGHTS TO COME
that considers the public benefit from a particular technology
must also be mindful of the property right conferred on
copyright owners, who are entitled to protection.20 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The common-law doctrine of contributory copyright
infringement is a valuable tool for enforcing the exclusive
rights guaranteed by copyright. This doctrine has become
increasingly important as the development of digital
technologies and high-speed telecommunications have made
it increasingly costly and inefficient for copyright owners to
enforce their rights against infringers directly.21 ° While the
doctrine was sufficient to impose liability in early file-sharing
cases such as Napster and Aimster, technological
developments soon required the Supreme Court to clarify the
bounds of the contributory liability doctrine as set forth in its
famous Sony decision.
The Court's opinion in Grokster affirmatively resolved the
question of whether liability would result in the case of an
innovator who lacked actual knowledge of infringement, yet
who evidenced a purpose and intent to cause infringing
activity.211 Unresolved in the Court's opinion and central to
the Ninth Circuit's contributory infringement analysis
established in Napster is the question of how the "inverse
Grokster" scenario will fare under Sony.21 2 Will an innovator
without evidence of inducement or an intent to cause
infringement, but who has actual knowledge of infringing
http://www.dancohen.org/blog/posts/impact of fieldv.google-on the-googlejlib
raryproject (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
209. The court in Perfect 10 acknowledged these conflicting interests in the
context of Google's image-search feature. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.
Supp. 2d 828, 859 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (noting in evaluating the public interest
factor for injunctive relief that Google's argument had merit, but so did the
public's interest in protecting copyright owners from likely acts of
infringement). Copyrights are undoubtedly property interests that are
protected by both the U.S. Constitution and federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). However, one might argue that a copyright
owner's absolute control of his intellectual property should not act to the
detriment of the constitutional prescription to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts, including progress that builds upon previous creative
ventures.
210. See discussion supra note 24.
211. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779.
212. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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activity, be able to avoid liability under Sony's safe harbor?
This comment suggests that after Grokster, the Ninth
Circuit should revise its analysis of Sony within the
contributory liability framework by adopting a balancing test
to determine Sony's applicability in the "inverse Grokster"
scenario.213 Based on the Seventh Circuit's test in Aimster,
this proposed test asks the court to consider the accused
infringer's actual knowledge of specific infringement, the
respective magnitudes of infringing and noninfringing uses,
the accused infringer's efforts to reduce or eliminate
infringing activity, and the public's interest in the product or
service giving rise to the infringing conduct. By adopting
such an approach, the Ninth Circuit will harmonize its
precedent in Napster with the Supreme Court's view of Sony
in Grokster and set forth an analytical framework for
contributory infringement that fairly balances the interests
on each side of the increasingly relevant "inverse Grokster"
scenario.
213. See discussion supra Part V.
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